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When Russia’s Vladimir Putin amassed his country’s forces around the border with Ukraine earlier this year, analysts on all sides expected a very different outcome. Against the full brunt of Moscow’s war machine, Kiev was not believed capable of holding on for long. Scenarios envisioned ranged from those akin to Russia’s earlier actions in Georgia and Crimea to Nazi Germany’s Blitzkrieg in the early stages of the Second World War.
The West, for its part, was expected to react strongly though not militarily. But any punitive actions against Moscow would have come too late to save Ukraine, in earlier assessments.
The conflict in Ukraine, as it has unfolded, presents a very different picture now. Russia’s military might, inflated seemingly by stunning Victory Day parades, was vastly overestimated. While exact casualties and losses are near impossible to verify, the anticipated blitz through Ukrainian territory has been reduced to a slog. But while Ukrainian forces have held on, retaking all seized territory and expelling all Russian forces so far seems a tall ask too in the absence of substantial military aid.
As far as political aims go, Putin, at least on the surface, seems to be staring at his worst-case scenario. If the goal was to diminish the United States’ influence and presence in Europe, and to make the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) an obsolete arrangement, the Russian strongman’s plans have all but backfired. Long chagrined by the Nato encroachment towards Russia’s borders, he now finds two neutral Scandinavian buffers – Sweden and Finland – petitioning for inclusion in the military alliance. Meanwhile, Europe’s Western states, long criticised for not pulling their weight in the continent’s security, have announced a renewed commitment to spend on their defence. They represent, in many ways, the political equivalent of a worst-case scenario, as far as Russia’s intended outcomes are concerned.
But beneath the surface, some fault lines may already be emerging. While Russia may have weakened its hand by the inability of its forces to achieve the initial goals of invasion, Europe too appears to be treading carefully. The sanctions imposed on Moscow have not had the determined effect due to lack of interest from states not aligned with the West. While leaders were quick to pledge assistance to Kiev immediately after the conflict began, individual states have balked at supplying any big-ticket military equipment amid fears of Russian reprisals.
Even the case of admitting Sweden and Finland into Nato, seen with some inevitability when the two nations announced their plans, is growing more complicated by the day. Turkey, which remains a member despite a strained relationship with the US and key European Union states, has announced it will block the Scandinavian expansion of the alliance due to its national security concerns. And while the entry of Sweden and Finland has its share of vocal supporters, prominent analysts have now come out cautioning against the move as well, warning that such ‘hubris’ provoked the Ukraine crisis in the first place.
“There are only two clear-cut benefits to bringing in the two Nordic nations. The first is symbolic: providing a clear demonstration of European and democratic solidarity against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The second is technical: Admitting Finland and Sweden would better align the membership of Nato with that of the EU, avoiding the unlikely but problematic scenario in which an EU member state is subject to aggression but is not covered by Nato’s Article 5 mutual-defence pact,” wrote the Atlantic Council’s Emma Ashford in a May 30 editorial for Bloomberg. “In every other respect, however, the question of Finnish and Swedish membership is more complicated and worrisome.”
“All parties concerned should take a deep breath and slow down,” wrote international lawyer and political scientist Anne-Marie Slaughter for the Financial Times. “The threat of Russia invading either Finland or Sweden is remote. But admitting them to the military alliance will redraw and deepen Europe’s 20th-century divisions in ways that will probably preclude far bolder and braver thinking about how to achieve peace and prosperity in the 21st.”
Even Henry Kissinger, one of the greatest diplomatic minds still alive, warned on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos that “Western countries should remember Russia’s importance to Europe and not get swept up in the mood of the moment.”
Cracks in a united front?
Against the backdrop of these developments, The Express Tribune reached out to some prominent observers and analysts on the present trajectory and future of Europe’s security. Speaking on the tracks the continent’s economic, financial and security architecture are moving on, Dr Anna Borshchevskaya said the shock of the Russian invasion of Ukraine had a galvanising effect on the European Union.
“The EU alliance remains strong,” she said. “Yes, there are disagreements but the Russian invasion in and of itself — an invasion of a sovereign and peaceful neighbour — and the brutality with which Russia invaded, has shocked Western European leaders.”
According to Dr Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Diane and Guildford Glazer Foundation Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East, European Union leaders unanimously agree that such a breach of the rules-based global order, along with Putin’s attempt to renegotiate the European security architecture is unacceptable. “It is too dangerous. Putin has brought onto Europe the largest war since the Second World War, along with the largest refugee crisis. It also bodes a global economic crisis,” added the analyst who is a contributor to Oxford Analytica and previously worked with the Atlantic Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Asked to what extent has on-going Ukraine conflict refocused the European security agenda towards a more conventional framing focusing on military risks and what trade-offs, if any, it had posed, Dr Borshchevskaya said: “From what I see the issue is not a trade-off of conventional military risks at the expense of others.”
“It is not zero-sum,” she stressed, adding that “Russia’s invasion did force a discussion of where the West misunderstood Russian military capabilities, where it overestimated them, as well as what are the fundamental assumption of Russian statecraft and Russian approach to war.”
Sharing his thoughts on Europe’s ability to present a collective response in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, senior European affairs analyst and managing editor of Greece’s Kappa News Yannis Koutsomitis said Europe has so far presented a remarkably unified front towards Russia's aggression in Ukraine. “Despite different levels of understanding European relations to Russia, almost all European (nations) agreed that Moscow’s unilateral actions cannot be tolerated,” he shared.
Koutsomitis cautioned, however, that there are certain limits to Europe's response. “We have all seen how dependent Europe is to Russian gas, and the hesitation of Germany, France and Italy to provide Ukraine with heavy weaponry,” he pointed out.
Asked if Russia had managed to expose deepening fissures in Europe and what a deepening security and financial crisis could bode for the continent, the analyst said some cracks could appear over the months that followed. “If the war will be prolonged for many months, I expect a number of European governments to grow tired of the confrontation and some cracks may appear in Europe's unified front towards the autumn,” Koutsomitis suggested. “I consider Italy, for example, a weak link in the equation given its strained economy and fragile coalition government.”
Uppsala University’s Dr Ashok Swain, on the other hand, presented a different picture. “Europe continues to be as divided as before,” he said when asked to share his thoughts on Europe’s ability to present a collective response in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “The collective response,” he stressed, “is only in political speeches but the difference exists not only in their response but also in their perceptions of threat from Russia.”
According to Dr Swain, who is a professor at the university’s department of peace and conflict research, Europe had no plan before nor has made any plan in the last three months to comprehensively deal with financial and security threats emanating from Russia. “Europe’s dependence on Russian energy has made the situation more complicated,” he replied when asked about whether Russia had managed to expose deepening fissures between various EU nations. “On the security front, some countries have increased their military expenditures and some others are trying to join Nato, but these late and half-hearted reactions are not going to be enough to meet the security threats from Russia,” he added.
Change of discourse
Dr Swain agreed that the war in Ukraine had forced other European nations to shift their energy and resources from conventional to more seemingly ‘urgent’ challenges to an extent. In some ways, Russia’s actions had managed to change prevalent discourse in the continent.
“In Europe, the focus has moved away from other issues and the public discourse is more or less concentrated on military security after the war in Ukraine,” noted Dr Swain. “The increased national military expenditure and support to Ukraine’s refugees have reduced Europe’s aid and assistance to the global South,” he said, sharing an example. “The issues of climate change and even Covid-19 have almost disappeared from their agenda,” he added.
‘Economics is Putin’s best weapon’
Replying to a question about whether the war in Ukraine had exposed the European Union’s inability to defend itself against any form of aggression,
The Washington Institute's Dr Borshchevskaya clarified that the grouping was an economic alliance, not a military one. “The EU never had one external foreign policy, nor a military policy. It has always been focused on economic cooperation,” she said. “Nato is a military alliance, and we now see that the Russian invasion has prompted Sweden and Finland to formally join the alliance,” she added.
According to Dr Borshchevskaya once the admission of the two Nordic nations takes place – and she believes it most likely will – Europe’s ability to defend itself will strengthen. “Of course the issue will remain that non-Nato members will remain vulnerable, and some Nato members such as the Baltic states will feel a degree of vulnerability as well,” she said. “At the same time, the shock of Russia’s invasion I think will remain in the minds of Europeans and the desire to commitment to prevent another invasion remains strong.”
The researcher added that the issue at present is different. “First, the war in Ukraine is far from over. We are looking at long-term protracted warfare. And the war could spill into other countries, including Moldova,” she pointed out.
“Second, the biggest challenge at present is the economic crisis. Russia’s blockage in the Black Sea, if left unchecked, threatens famine in the Middle East and North Africa, which will have second and third order effects, including a mass refugee wave into Europe, so Europe could be hit with a double wave of refugees.”
Dr Borshchevskaya said inflation in Europe would likely grow over the summer as well. “It is the economic crisis that at present is Putin’s greater weapon and presents the more serious challenge,” she stressed.
The future of European defence
When asked about whether Europe can create a common security plan or architecture to deal with its collective defence needs, both Dr Swain and Dr Borshchevskaya suggested that it would remain a challenge in the foreseeable future despite the crisis Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had created.
“Europe’s common defense architecture can’t be achieved overnight. It needs to be a long-term and well-planned process,” said Dr Swain while sharing his views on the topic. “Unfortunately, the Europe is divided and the situation is becoming worse.”
“As I mentioned earlier, the EU was never a military alliance nor even a political one in the sense that it never spoke with one external foreign policy voice. Finding one European voice will likely remain a challenge in the foreseeable future,” added Dr Borshchevskaya.
For Dr Swain, the rise of right-wing populism and nationalism in Europe was among the biggest obstacles to a common security plan to deal with military aggression. “That does not really help for the Europe to plan and prepare for a united European defense. As long as right-wing populism is rising in Europe, achieving a common security plan is just a pipe dream,” he stressed.
That said, according to Dr Borshchevskaya, European nations would keep focusing on Nato for their collective security. “Putin’s invasion has prompted the very thing he wanted to avoid — additional Nato enlargement. Europe will likely keep looking towards Nato, but also greater overall cooperation,” she noted.
“The challenge will always be that any member of a military alliance will have greater protection than one outside of it,” she conceded. “But again, the Russian invasion has shocked the European leaders, and the issue is not necessarily having one common security plan but simply ensuring greater deterrence, and Europe is talking precisely about ensuring future deterrence.”
Kappa News’ Yannis Koutsomitis agreed with Dr Borschevskaya’s assessment, adding that the Russian actions in Ukraine had convinced European nations of the United States’ indispensability. “The war in Ukraine has shown that US nuclear deterrence is crucial for a reliable European security structure, but also that European countries need and eventually will strengthen the continent’s conventional defence forces,” he said. “Germany has just passed a historic constitutional amendment with a massive €100 billion defence package, while Sweden and Finland have broken their centuries-old neutrality status by applying for Nato membership. So Europe will grow stronger out of this ordeal but definitely more aware of the significance of US security guarantees.”
Voices from the East, however, are far from optimistic. According to an assessment of the situation by China’s retired senior colonel Zhou Bou, as the number of countries that join the EU increase, the more insecure Europe will be. The invasion of Ukraine, in his opinion has triggered the geopolitical shift from “the West to the East.” In one of his articles for the South China Morning Post, Zhou Bou, who is a senior fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert, cautioned that Nato and the West must heed Russia’s warnings to avoid nuclear holocaust.
The path to NATO expansion
1949 – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States – sign the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington DC
1952 – Greece and Turkey join the alliance
1955 – West Germany joins Nato
1967 – Nato's new headquarters opens in Brussels
1982 – Spain joins Nato
1999 – The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland become the first former Soviet bloc states to join Nato
November 2002 – Seven countries – Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – invited to join alliance at summit in Prague
August 2003 – Nato takes control of the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) in Afghanistan – its first major operation outside Europe
October 2003 – Nato launches a 9,000-member rapid-reaction force, which can be deployed anywhere in the world at short notice
March 2004 – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia formally welcomed in Washington as new members
April 2004 – Nato signs agreements establishing Russian military liaison offices at Nato HQ
December 2005 – Nato foreign ministers agree to expand the alliance's role in Afghanistan. Plans include the deployment of thousands more troops in the south
April 2008 – Bucharest Summit invites Albania and Croatia to join Nato
August 2008 – Nato says there can be no ‘business as usual’ with Moscow unless it pulls its troops out of Georgia. Russia halts all military co-operation with Nato
September 2008 – Nato delegation visits Georgia to express solidarity following war with Russia
March 2009 – Nato says that high-level contacts with Russia will be resumed after Nato's 60th anniversary summit
April 2009 – Nato's 60th anniversary summit. Albania and Croatia are formally inducted, increasing membership to 28
March 2011 – UN Security Council approves imposition of no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. Nato agrees to take on responsibility for enforcing the no-fly zone.
October 2011 – Nato formally ends its Libya mission after the fall of the last Gaddafi stronghold, and offers to help the new government with security matters
November 2011 – Pakistan halts Nato ground supplies to Afghanistan after a Nato airstrike kills 24 of its troops
2012 – A leaked Nato reports suggests that the Afghan Taliban are helped by Pakistani security services, thus causing a rift between the former and the Pakistani government
2014 – Nato suspends its cooperation with Russia after its annexation of Crimea
2015 – Nato's International Security Assistance Force mission ends in Afghanistan
2017 – Montenegro joins Nato
2020 – North Macedonia becomes Nato’s 30th member
2022 – Sweden and Finland shed their decades-long neutrality and announce their willingness to apply for Nato membership after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
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